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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, healthcare plays a central role in the na-
tion's economy, with healthcare spending reaching approximately
$3.2 trillion in 20151 and accounting for 17.8% of the United States
* Eduardo J. Benatuil is a 2018 J.D. candidate at Duquesne University School of Law.
He graduated from Carnegie Mellon University in 2011 with a B.S. degree in Economics.





gross domestic product.2 While the legislature and the executive
branch have wrangled in recent years to reform the healthcare sys-
tem,3 the judicial branch, and, more importantly, the United States
Supreme Court, has assumed the role of interpreting legislative ac-
tions and deliberating on the constitutionality of questions related
to healthcare.i The Supreme Court has also weighed in on several
important constitutional questions surrounding individual
healthcare rights, such the right to end one's life5 and access to phy-
sician-assisted suicide.6
Adjudication for constitutional matters in the American legal sys-
tem is a lengthy and time-consuming process, requiring multiple
levels of appellate review before a final decision can be rendered by
a court. In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, the legal
guardians of Nancy Cruzan, a patient in a persistent vegetative
state, brought a declaratory judgment action with a Missouri state
court, seeking to remove Ms. Cruzan's artificial hydration and nu-
trition support measures.7 The initial action was filed in July
1988,8 and required two appeals prior to its resolution by the United
States Supreme Court: one by the Missouri Department of Health
to the state supreme court in 19889 and another, by the petitioning
guardians, in 1989, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari.10
After the Supreme Court rendered a decision in 1990, the case was
remanded to a state court, where a probate court judge entered an
order granting the petitioning guardians' request for the removal of
Ms. Cruzan's life-sustaining feeding tube on December 14, 1990.11
Ms. Cruzan passed away on December 26, 1990.12 In total, the end-
2. Id.
3. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
4. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the
United States Constitution).
5. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (concluding that a
state may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian
seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent veg-
etative state).
6. See, e.g., Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (affirming Washington state's ban
on physician-assisted suicide as reasonably related to the promotion and protection of the
medical profession and in conformity with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution).
7. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.
8. Id. at 267-68.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 265.
11. Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y.





to-end process of resolving Ms. Cruzan's constitutional question,
from its initial filing in July 1988, to the rendering of a final verdict
by a probate court judge in December 1990, lasted approximately
two-and-a-half years.
Similarly, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the petitioning parties,
comprised of three terminally ill patients, four physicians, and a
nonprofit organization, brought a declaratory judgment action
against the State of Washington seeking a declaration that the
state's ban on physician-assisted suicide violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The initial action was filed
in January 1994,14 and required two appeals before it reached its
resolution with the United States Supreme Court: one by the State
of Washington to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in 1994, which was not decided until 1996,15 and another
one by the petitioning parties to the Supreme Court in 1997.16 In
total, the constitutional question raised by the petitioning parties
took three years to reach its resolution, beginning with the petition-
ing parties' initial filing in January 1994 to the rendering of a final
decision by the Supreme Court in June 1997.
As these two cases demonstrate, timeliness i  an important factor
in resolving cases involving the constitutionality of an adverse ac-
tion taken by a government agency against a patient-plaintiff.
Rapid resolution to these types of constitutional questions is criti-
cal, especially when the litigating patient is faced with circum-
stances where his or her medical condition could worsen throughout
the course of ongoing litigation, and a verdict in his or her favor
could provide the necessary relief to treat or abate the condition.
More importantly, the failure to address a constitutional question
in a timely manner burdens an individual's exercise of his or her
rights, and it extends the constitutional injury until a final decision
can be rendered by the highest levels of judicial review.
The Supreme Court of Costa Rica, by and through the operation
of the Constitutional Chamber and the constitutional writ of am-
paro, provides an alternative approach in the adjudication of con-
stitutional questions related to an individual citizen's healthcare
claims against an adverse government agency.17 The Supreme
Court of Costa Rica achieves this by having a dedicated judicial
13. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1997).
14. Id. at 707-08 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.
Wash. 1994)).
15. Id. at 709.
16. Id.
17. Ley de Jurisdicci6n Constitucional [Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction], Oct. 10,
1989, art. 29 (Costa Rica).
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body solely tasked with reviewing and deliberating constitutional
questions,1 8 and acting as the first, and final, judicial entity review-
ing these issues; this thus eliminates a protracted judicial appeals
process, which would otherwise delay, burden and lengthen an in-
dividual's constitutional rights.19
The purpose of this article is to describe the constitutional adju-
dication process for healthcare questions in Costa Rica, the consti-
tutional writ of amparo-which allows citizens to bring claims to
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court-and the bene-
fits and limitations of this constitutional adjudication process. Part
II will provide a brief history of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica,
the Constitutional Chamber, its general operation, and the differ-
ent constitutional writs that can be submitted by Costa Rican citi-
zens in the defense of their individual rights and liberties. Part III
will describe the writ of amparo and its operation within the system
of constitutional adjudication in Costa Rica. Part IV will highlight
some of the key features of the Costa Rican health system, and it
will explain how the Constitutional Chamber's jurisprudence on the
matter of the right to health developed in response to individual
requests for the preservation of those rights within the health sys-
tem. Part V will analyze the impact that the constitutional adjudi-
cation process has on the Costa Rican public health and social se-
curity systems, as well as its conceptual and practical benefits and
limitations.
II. STRUCTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE OF COSTA
RICA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER
The Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica ( "Corte Suprema")
is the highest court within the Costa Rican judicial branch of gov-
ernment.20 The Corte Suprema consists of three specialized cham-
bers, which are created by statute, and have cassation21 jurisdiction
to strictly review questions of law and jurisprudence from lower
courts across different fields of law.2 2 The first chamber, known as
the Sala Primera, possesses cassation jurisdiction over civil and
18. Olman A. Rodriguez L., Constitutional Litigation: Procedural Protections of Consti-
tutionalism in the Americas...and Beyond: Article: The Costa Rican Constitutional Jurisdic-
tion, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 243, 251 (2011).
19. Id.
20. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA],
Nov. 7, 1949, art. 156 (Costa Rica).
21. See Cassation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "cassation" as a
quashing or the power given to a court to quash decrees from inferior courts).
22. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA],
Nov. 7, 1949, art. 153 & 157 (Costa Rica).
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commercial matters, with exception to issues concerning family
law.2 3 The second chamber, the Sala Segunda, has cassation juris-
diction in matters related to family law, successions and bank-
ruptcy.24 The third chamber, known as the Sala Tercera, or the
Sala de Casaci6n Penal, has cassation jurisdiction in adult and ju-
venile criminal matters.25 These three chambers are each composed
of five magistrates,26 who are elected by a two-thirds majority of the
Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica27 for eight-year terms.28
In 1989, a fourth, specialized chamber, known as the Sala Cuarta
or Sala Constitucional ("Constitutional Chamber"), was created
with exclusive and nonreviewable jurisdiction over constitutional
matters.29 The Constitutional Chamber reviews constitutional
writs filed by individual citizens, resolves jurisdictional conflicts be-
tween the Costa Rican branches of government, including the Su-
preme Electoral Tribunal, and provides consultations on constitu-
tional amendment bills and ratifications of international agree-
ments, treaties, or other legislative bills, as provided by law.30 The
Constitutional Chamber is composed of seven magistrates,31 who
are subject to the same terms as the magistrates from the three
chambers of cassation jurisdiction.32
The Constitutional Chamber reviews six types of petitions: the
habeas corpus, the amparo, the action of unconstitutionality, the
legislative consultation, the judicial consultation, and the resolu-
tion of intragovernmental conflicts.33 The habeas corpus and the
amparo can be submitted by individual citizens to the Supreme
Court in an effort to exercise their individual rights against an ad-
verse government action.34 The habeas corpus petition seeks to pro-
tect a constitutional right of personal liberty and freedom of move-
23. Ley Organica del Poder Judicial [Law of the Judicial Power], July 1, 1993, art. 54
(Costa Rica).
24. Id. art. 55.
25. Id. art. 56.
26. Id. art. 49.
27. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA],
Nov. 7, 1949, art. 157 (Costa Rica).
28. Id. art. 158.
29. Id. art. 10; Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at art. 4, 7 & 11 (Costa
Rica).
30. Law of the Judicial Power, supra note 23, art. 57 (Costa Rica); CONSTITUCION
POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA], Nov. 7, 1949, art. 10
(Costa Rica).
31. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA],
Nov. 7, 1949, art. 158 (Costa Rica).
32. Law of the Judicial Power, supra note 23, art. 49, 55 & 56 (Costa Rica).
33. Id. art. 57.
34. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at art. 15 & 29 (Costa Rica).
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ment in scenarios where a government authority imposes an un-
lawful detention or restriction on either one of the aforementioned
rights.35 Similarly, the amparo seeks to protect all other individual
fundamental rights that are not covered by the habeas corpus peti-
tion, and it can be brought forth in cases where there is an admin-
istrative action or omission carried out by a public government en-
tity or officer which violates or threatens to violate an individual's
fundamental rights.36
The action of unconstitutionality consists of a review of the con-
stitutionality of laws that violate, either by action or omission, any
constitutional principles or norms, or whenever the process of
adopting laws or legislative agreements violates internal proce-
dures or the Costa Rican legislature.37 This writ can only be intro-
duced when there is a pending judicial matter, such as a writ of
habeas corpus or an amparo, in which the unconstitutionality of a
law or norm is brought forth as a reasonable method of adjudicating
the injured right or interest.38
The legislative consultation allows the Constitutional Chamber
to provide consultative opinions on pending proposals to constitu-
tional amendments, treaties and conventions, and amendments to
the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.39 Legislative consultations
exist in two forms: first, in the context of a judicial consultation and,
second, in the presence of a constitutional question or conflict be-
tween two or more governmental agencies.40 The judicial consulta-
tion allows judges to consult the Constitutional Chamber about the
constitutionality of norms, actions, or omissions requiring applica-
tion in a judicial proceeding.41 The writ of resolution of intergov-
ernmental conflicts allows the Constitutional Chamber to resolve
conflicts of competency and authority between the branches of the
Costa Rican government-including the Supreme Tribunal of Elec-
tions, the Office of the Comptroller General, decentralized entities,
municipalities, and other government agencies-where the conflict
arises as a result of a constitutional grant of authority.42
35. Id. art. 15.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. 73.
38. Id. art. 75.
39. Id. art. 96.
40. Id.
41. Id. art. 102.
42. Id. art. 109.
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Prior to the creation of the Constitutional Chamber in 1989, the
Costa Rican Constitution of 1949 governed the judicial review pro-
cess. 43 The pre-1989 constitutional adjudication process contained
a series of inefficiencies:
The system of constitutional adjudication was said to be illogi-
cal in that judicial review was neither concentrated nor diffuse,
but haphazardly allocated. .. . Habeas corpus cases were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the full Supreme Court, but
amparo cases were either within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the First Chamber of the Supreme Court or within the original
jurisdiction of a district judge and subject to review by the
Third Chamber of the Supreme Court. Statutes and decrees de-
clared unconstitutional by a two-thirds majority of the Su-
preme Court became "absolutely null" by virtue of the express
language of Article 10 of the Constitution, but decisions in ha-
beas corpus and amparo cases, in keeping with general princi-
ples of the Civil Law, bound only the parties.44
The 1989 reforms, along with the enactment of the Law of Con-
stitutional Jurisdiction, strengthened individual constitutional ad-
judication process in several ways. First, the reforms expanded con-
stitutional jurisdiction to include norms and principles of interna-
tional human rights law through the expansion of constitutional ju-
risdiction, which now included norms and principles of interna-
tional human rights laws in effect in Costa Rica.4 5 Next, the re-
forms gave sole jurisdiction of the writ of amparo to the newly cre-
ated Constitutional Chamber4 6 by repealing the Law of Amparo of
1950, which assigned jurisdiction of amparos to the First and Third
Chambers of the Supreme Court.4 7 Additionally, the reforms ex-
panded the writ of amparo to protect rights acquired under inter-
national law that were not protected by habeas corpus and consti-
tutional rights.4 8  Equally, the reforms to amparos were also
amended to include individual protections against adverse actions
by private persons performing public functions.4 9
43. Robert S. Barker, Judicial Review in Costa Rica: Evolution and Recent Developments,
7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE Am. 267, 277-79 (2000).
44. Id. at 277-78 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 279-80.
46. Id. at 280.
47. Id.




1II. THE AMPARO PROCESS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
A. Overview of the Amparo Process
Title III, Chapter 1 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction de-
fines the rights protected by an amparo.50 The amparo guarantees
individual fundamental rights and liberties, except those which are
not protected by the writ of habeas corpus, against actions or omis-
sions taken by a government entity or officer.5 1 The amparo also
protects against actions and omissions founded on erroneously in-
terpreted or improperly applied government norms or rules.52 The
Political Constitution of Costa Rica also defines the scope of the am-
paro as an instrument that can be brought in order to "preserve the
enjoyment of other rights established in the Constitution, as well as
those fundamental rights established in international human
rights instruments applicable to the Republic of Costa Rica."53 As
a result, a number of human rights treaties that Costa Rica has
signed are part of the Constitutional Chamber's jurisprudence by
and through the operation of the amparo process.54
In addition to being an instrument that can be filed without any
cost to the petitioner,55 the formal requirements for admitting an
amparo are low. The Constitutional Chamber has held that, be-
cause any person can file an amparo,5 6 the absence of a power of
attorney or the presentation of an invalid one will not nullify the
petitioner's standing.57 The writ must be directed against any and
all public servants or heads of the government agencies that are
acting as the presumed authors of the grievance.5 8 The Law of Con-
stitutional Jurisdiction also allows a party with a "legitimate inter-
est in the result of the writ" to participate and intervene as a co-
respondent alongside the presumed aggrieving party.59 Amparos
can be submitted at any time as long as the violation, threat, or
50. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at tit. III (Costa Rica).
51. Id. art. 29.
52. Id.
53. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA],
Nov. 7, 1949, art. 48 (Costa Rica).
54. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 264.
55. Id. at 260.
56. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at art. 33 (Costa Rica).
57. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 260 (citing Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia [SCCSJ] [Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice], Exp. No. 94-
05862-0007-CO (Costa Rica)).




restriction persists-and up to two months after the direct effects
of the action have ceased-with respect to the aggrieved party.60
In order for an amparo to be admitted by the Constitutional
Chamber, it must express the act or omission that motivates the
action, the right that the proponent considers violated or threat-
ened, the name of the public servant or government agency causing
the violation or threat, and proof of the proposed injury or threat.6 1
The proponent does not need to cite the exact constitutional norm
that is being injured, as long as the amparo clearly expresses the
threatened right.62 The only time an explicit right or violation must
be cited is when the proponent requests aid under an international
treaty or charter.63
Amparos must be presented in writing, either handwritten or
typed, and its mode of presentation is not subject to any formali-
ties.64 For example, the Constitutional Chamber has admitted pe-
titions signed on bread and paper cartons and has upheld the ac-
ceptance of amparos without the authentication of the claimant's
signature.65 A failure to meet the specificity requirements, as
stated in by Article 38 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, will
not result in the immediate dismissal of the writ; instead, the peti-
tioner will be informed of the error and will be given three days to
correct it.66 If corrections are not made within the proposed
timeframe, the writ will be dismissed.6 7
The filing of an amparo will not suspend the effect of laws and
other norms questioned within the writ, but it will suspend the ap-
plication of those laws to the petitioner.6 8 Once an amparo is ad-
mitted, depending on the circumstances, the Constitutional Cham-
ber can order, and subsequently suspend, any preliminary injunc-
tions or temporary restraining orders it considers prudent against
the continued exercise of the adverse act or practice.69 In making
its determination regarding whether to implement a restraint or
60. Id. art. 35.




65. See Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 260 (citing BRUCE M. WILSON, ENFORCING RIGHTS
AND EXERCISING AN ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION: COSTA RICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 60
(Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa eds. 2011)); Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, su-
pra note 17, at art. 18 (Costa Rica).
66. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at art. 42 (Costa Rica).
67. Id.




injunction, the Constitutional Chamber must balance the prejudi-
cial effect that the suspension of adverse laws and actions might
have on public interests against the effect the continuation of the
laws and actions might have on the petitioner.70
If the amparo is not rejected or resolved prior to its admission,
the Constitutional Chamber will request an informative report from
the public servant or government agency that is listed on the am-
paro as the alleged author of the injury, threat, or omission.71 When
requesting the report, the Constitutional Chamber can also request
any administrative files or documentation related to the claims
made in the amparo.72 The deadline to provide this report will be
one to three days and will be determined by certain factors, such as
the nature of the claims set forth in the amparo, the distance be-
tween the parties, and the speed of communications between the
court and the parties.73 Reports submitted to the Supreme Court
are considered to be rendered under oath; as such, any errors or
falsehoods will result in perjury and false testimony charges
against the government officer tendering the report, based on the
nature of the inaccuracies in the report.74
If the report is not rendered within the established deadline, the
Constitutional Chamber will take the facts set forth in the amparo
as true and could proceed to admit and resolve the writ without any
further action, unless the Constitutional Chamber deems that a
preliminary investigation is required.75 If a report is rendered, and
the charges set forth in the amparo are confirmed by the report, the
Constitutional Chamber will admit the writ.76 Alternatively, if the
petitioner's factual allegations are unconfirmed by the report, the
Constitutional Chamber may order a request for additional and es-
sential information, which will be rendered within three days by
the petitioner and respondent at a hearing in front of the Constitu-
tional Chamber.77 Prior to reaching a verdict, and in support of its
deliberation on the matter addressed in the amparo, the Constitu-
tional Chamber can order other investigations or requests.78
If the Constitutional Chamber considers that the contested ac-
tions or omissions are reasonably founded on constitutional laws or
70. Id.
71. Id. art. 43.
72. Id.
73. Id. art. 44.
74. Id.
75. Id. art. 45.
76. Id. art. 46.
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 47.
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rules that are in force and that the constitutionality of the laws is
also being challenged for violations to the petitioner's individual
rights or liberties, the Constitutional Chamber will admit the am-
paro and suspend the writ.79 Once this takes place, the petitioner
will be directed by the Constitutional Chamber to file an action of
unconstitutionality within fifteen days.80 If the amparo contests an
affirmative act by a government agency or public, the relief pro-
vided by the amparo must guarantee the aggrieved party his or her
ability to enjoy the threatened right, and, whenever possible, to
make the petitioner whole by restoring him or her to the same state
enjoyed prior to the violation or aggravating act.81 If the amparo
was introduced to have a governmental authority regulate, execute,
or apply a law or disposition, the amparo will require the govern-
mental authority to carry out the requested action within a two-
month period.82 Similarly, if the amparo requests the nonperfor-
mance of the action or omission, the amparo will require the pro-
posed action to take place within a time period defined by the court,
with prejudice toward the governmental agency if there is no ac-
tion.83 If the constitutional injury is in the form of conduct, material
action, or a threat, the amparo will require a case of the activity, so
as to prevent any new violations, threats, disturbances, or re-
strictions.84
If an amparo is granted and the contested adverse action has
ceased, but the adverse action has run its course to the point where
it would not be possible for the petitioner to enjoy the threatened
fundamental right, the amparo will contain an order forbidding the
government agency or public servant from engaging in the adverse
action listed in the petitioner's filing.85 If the order is disobeyed,
the offending party will have committed a crime, which is punisha-
ble by fines or imprisonment under Article 71 of the Law of Consti-
tutional Jurisdiction.86
Indemnification of damages and costs associated with the filing
of an amparo are also set forth by the Law of Constitutional Juris-
diction.87 A granted amparo will include an indemnification order,
where the offending government agency will pay damages for harm
79. Id. art. 48.
80. Id.




85. Id. art. 50.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 51.
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incurred by the petitioner resulting from the adverse action, in ad-
dition to the costs associated with the resolution of the amparo.8
However, if the amparo is withdrawn by the petitioner, or rejected
by the Constitutional Chamber, the petitioner will be ordered to pay
the costs associated with the resolution of the amparo with a find-
ing by the Constitutional Chamber that the petitioner was reckless
in filing the writ.89 If an administrative or judicial order revokes,
stops, or suspends the alleged adverse action while the amparo is
still pending resolution, the Constitutional Chamber will approve
the amparo strictly for indemnification purposes.90 Under this cir-
cumstance, the petitioner can cease any further action on the am-
paro, at which point the Constitutional Chamber can archive the
case file for the amparo; however, the case file may be reopened if
the administrative or judicial order is not obeyed.91
When an amparo is granted by the Constitutional Chamber, the
aggrieving government agency or public servant must comply with
the orders contained within the amparo without delay.92 If the of-
fending party does not carry out the order within forty-eight hours
following the entry of the order, the Constitutional Chamber can
direct a supervising entity to carry out the order and to initiate a
disciplinary order against the noncompliant party.93 Additionally,
the Constitutional Chamber can file a judicial action against the
aggrieving party or parties, and, following a forty-eight-hour period,
against the supervising entity that did not carry out the signed ju-
dicial order.94 If the aggrieving party or supervising entity is sub-
ject to governmental immunity, the Constitutional Chamber will
send the case to the Public Ministry of Costa Rica,95 an agency
housed in the Judicial Branch. If the aggrieving government
agency or public servant carries out the order set forth in the am-
paro after the Constitutional Chamber initiates a judicial proceed-
ing for noncompliance by the aggrieving party, the proceeding may
continue against the agency, if its acts or omissions constitute a
crime, at which point the Constitutional Chamber will forward the
case to the Public Ministry.96
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. art. 52.
91. Id.




96. Id. art. 54.
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B. The Amparo Today: A Brief Numerical Case Study
Amparos filed against government agencies for the protection of
individual rights constitute a significant percentage of the cases
that are brought forth to the Constitutional Chamber. Following
the judicial reforms of 1989, which gave sole jurisdiction of amparos
to the newly created Constitutional Chamber, this judicial body has
handled a steadily increasing volume of writs of habeas corpus, am-
paro, and actions of unconstitutionality filed by individual citi-
zens-beginning with 365 filings in 1989 and reaching a total of
19,476 items filed in 2014.97 Statistics published by the Constitu-
tional Chamber show that, in 2016, the judicial body received
16,188 petitions for amparos, which represented 90.4% of petitions
submitted to the court.98 In contrast, the individuals filed 1,474
habeas corpus petitions and 244 actions of unconstitutionality,
which represented 8.2% and 1.4% of the submissions made to the
Constitutional Chamber, respectively.99
A notable feature of the Constitutional Chamber is the average
turnaround times for the three types of individually filed writs that
are admitted for review and voted upon by the Constitutional
Chamber. According to the Constitutional Chamber, in 2015, the
average turnaround time for an amparo-from its admission into
the Constitutional Chamber to its deliberation, vote, and final res-
olution by the judicial entity-was one month and two weeks.100
Moreover, in 2015, the average turnaround time for habeas corpus
petitions was thirteen days, whereas the average time for actions of
unconstitutionality was fifteen months.101 When comparing the ha-
beas corpus and amparo petitions, the short turnaround of the for-
mer is attributed to the fact that the right asserted within the ha-
97. Tendencia histdrica anual del nimero de casos entrados en la Sala Constitucional
durante el periodo 1989-2016, SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA
[CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE], https://www.poder-judi-
cial.go.cr/salaconstitucionallindex.php/2016-06-27- 17-08-39/item/38- 1-tendencia-historica-
anual-del-numero-de-casos-entrado (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
98. Tendencia histdrica de los recursos de amparo, h6beas corpus y acciones de inconsti-
tucionalidad entrados en la Sala Constitucional durante el periodo de 1989-2016, SALA
CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA [CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE], https://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucionallin-
dex.php/2016-06-27-17-08-39/item/41-historico-habeas-y-otros-1989-2016 (last visited Jan.
15, 2018).
99. Id.
100. Promedio de Duracidn de los Votos de Fondo, SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE
SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA [CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE],
https://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucionallindex.php/2016-06-27-17-08-39/item/48-




beas corpus petition is that of the deprivation of an individual's lib-
erty.102 As a result, habeas corpus petitions are reviewed on a pri-
ority basis over amparos and actions of unconstitutionality.10 3
In 2016, the Constitutional Chamber adopted 4,475 amparos and
habeas corpus petitions, conditionally approved 640, denied 5,981
requests, and dismissed 609 amparos and habeas corpus peti-
tions. 10 4 The Constitutional Chamber reviewed amparo petitions
that ranged across a wide variety of subject areas, which included
matters involving individual rights to labor, healthcare, education,
transportation, social security, immigration, and minority rights.105
Notably, in 2016, there were 4,471 amparos that were reviewed and
voted upon by the Constitutional Chamber involving the protection
of the individual right to health, which was the second-most re-
viewed category of amparos, behind those related to labor rights.106
IV. THE HEALTH AMPARO - PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
WITHIN THE COSTA RICAN PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM
In order to better understand the operation of the amparo in the
context of the protection of individual health rights, it is necessary
to examine the nature of the healthcare system in Costa Rica, as
well as how the individual right to health became a part of consti-
tutional practice. Costa Rica's healthcare system is almost entirely
publicly funded and administered, with a small, but growing, pri-
vate healthcare component.107  Within the nation's public
healthcare system, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Cos-
tarricense de Seguro Social, hereinafter CCSS), a government
agency under the purview of the Ministry of Health, acts as the
largest healthcare provider in the nation, employing over 90% of all
registered physicians in the country.108 The CCSS is Costa Rica's
102. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 260.
103. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at art. 19 (Costa Rica).
104. Estadisticas por tema, SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, COSTA RICA [CONSTITUTIONAL
CHAMBER, COSTA RICA], https://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucionallindex.php/2016-
06-27-17-08-16, (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (click on the "Estadisticas ario 2016" link to down-
load the relevant Word document; refer to "CUADRO No.2").
105. Id. tbl.3.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Brian Jacob, Closing the Gaps: The Challenge to Protect Costa Rica's Health
System, 15 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 77, 80 (2010).
108. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 267 (citing BRUCE M. WILSON, THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH RIGHTS LITIGATION IN COSTA RICA, HEALTH RIGHTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Alicia Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds. 2011)).
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largest insurer, providing universal coverage for 90% of the popula-
tion of Costa Rica.109 The agency administers all of the public hos-
pitals in the nation's largest urban centers, as regional public clin-
ical services centers, known as the Basic Teams for Integral Assis-
tance in Health (Equipos Basicos de Atenci6n Integral a la Salud,
hereinafter EBAIS), which complement the services provided at the
larger hospitals.1 10 The result is an integrated healthcare delivery
model administered by the CCSS and funded by the central govern-
ment-as well as mandatory salary taxes11 1 and contributions from
employees, employers and the state.112
The predominantly public health system has its practical limita-
tions. Common challenges include the denial of procedures or med-
ications due to budgetary limitations,113 long waiting times to re-
ceive medical attention and services,1 14 and instances of healthcare
fraud and abuse, in the form of unnecessary or excessive prescrip-
tions and examinations.1 15  In the face of these inefficient
healthcare outcomes, individual citizens have sought to enforce
their right to healthcare with the judicial branch.11 6
The constitutional right to health was recognized by the Consti-
tutional Chamber in 1997 when it reviewed an amparo filed by in-
dividuals with HIV/AIDS. 117 The petitioners' main claim was that
the CCSS, in its capacity as a state-funded healthcare provider, had
refused to grant their requests for life-sustaining medication to
treat their disease, and the organization's refusal threatened their
right to life and social security.11 8 The Constitutional Chamber re-
versed the CCSS' decision, and it ordered the entity to dispense
medication not only to the petitioners but also to all people living
with HIV/AIDS. 119
In reaching its conclusion, the Constitutional Chamber reviewed
several bodies of law, including the Political Constitution of Costa
Rica, as well as a series of human rights treaties and agreements
109. Jacob, supra note 107, at 80.
110. Id. at 79.
111. Id. at 80.
112. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 267.
113. Id.
114. Jacob, supra note 107, at 81.
115. Id. at 81-82.
116. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 267.
117. See Bruce M. Wilson, Constitutional Rights in the Age of Assertive Superior Courts:
An Evaluation of Costa Rica's Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, 48 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 451, 468-69 (2012) (citing Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice






that the Costa Rican government had signed and ratified. The Con-
stitutional Chamber reasoned that the individual right to
healthcare was related to the right to protection of human life and
by the right to social security protection, which are set forth by Ar-
ticles 21 and 73 of the nation's Constitution, respectively.1 20 Addi-
tionally, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that the right to
health was protected by international treaties signed by Costa Rica,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Pact of Civil and Political Rights, and the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, which, under Article 48 of the Political Con-
stitution of Costa Rica, grants these treaties the same force of law
as the constitution.12 1
The constitutional right to health has been recognized as an in-
dependent1 22 and fundamental1 23 right extending from the right to
life, as well as to a social right that must be guaranteed by the gov-
ernment.124 The jurisprudential construction evolved over time into
an independent constitutional right to health, despite not being ex-
plicitly described in the Constitution of Costa Rica.125 The Consti-
tutional Chamber derived the right to health from articles 21126 and
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Mag. Fernando Castillo Viquez, Derecho A La Salud. Recientes Evoluciones de la
Jurisprudencia Constitucional [The Right to Health. Recent Evolution of Constitutional Ju-
risprudence], at 7 (2014), https://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/im-
ages/cefcca/Documentos/Derechoalasalud/CONFERENCIADERECHOALASALUD.pdf
(Costa Rica).
123. See Mag. Ana Virginia Calzada Miranda and Mag. Fernando Castillo Viquez, El De-
recho a la Salud bajo el Sistema de Justicia Constitucional Costarricense [The Right to Health
under the Costa Rican Constitutional Justice System], at 2 (2012), https://www.poder-judi-
cial.go.cr/salaconstitucionallindex.php/documentos-de-interes?download=5048:3-el-derecho-
a-la-salud-bajo-el-sistema-costarricense-magistrados-calzada-y-castillo (Costa Rica).
124. Id. at 7.
125. See BRUCE M. WILSON & OLMAN A. RODRIGUEZ, COSTA RICA: UNDERSTANDING
VARIATIONS, IN COMPLIANCE IN SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF
COMPLIANCE - MAKING IT STICK 132 (2017).
126. Id. (citing CONSTITUCIcN POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF
COSTA RICA], Nov. 7, 1949, art. 21 (Costa Rica)) (defining human life as inviolable).
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73127 of the Constitution, as well as a number of human rights in-
struments,128 which have been given great weight by the Constitu-
tional Chamber.129 As a result, the right to health was recognized
as fundamental and independent by the Constitutional Chamber. 130
The Constitutional Chamber has upheld the right to health on
several occasions,131 stating that:
[The] right to life, recognized in article 21 of the Constitution
is the cornerstone upon which the rest of the fundamental
rights of the inhabitants of the republic lay. Equally, within
this article, the right to health finds its grip, given that life is
inconceivable if a human being is not guaranteed the minimum
conditions for an adequate and harmonic psychological, physi-
cal and environmental balance.132
More importantly, the constitutional right to health is one that
has been given a broad interpretation by the Constitutional Cham-
ber's jurisprudence, which has referred to the concept of health as:
One that extends beyond the dated notion of the "absence of
health," opting to understand it as the integral state of an in-
dividual from a spiritual, emotional, and physical perspective,
following the concepts set forth by the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), an organization that defines "health" within its
own Constitution, as a complete state of physical, mental, spir-
itual, emotional and social wellbeing, and not just as the ab-
sence of afflictions or diseases.133
127. Id. (citing CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF
COSTA RICA], Nov. 7, 1949, art. 73 (Costa Rica)) (establishing social security "for the benefit
of manual and intellectual workers, regulated by a system of compulsory contributions by
the State, employers and workers, to protect against risks of illness, disability, maternity,
old age, death and other contingencies, as defined by law").
128. Id. at 132 n.39-42 (enumerating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Amer-
ican Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as international instruments
by which the constitutional right to health was developed by the Constitutional Chamber of
Costa Rica).
129. Id. at 132 n.43 (treating the international instruments as having "an almost supra
constitutional value").
130. Id.
131. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 267 (citing Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Justice, Exp. No. 08-016233-0007-CO (2008), Exp. No. 07-011668-0007-CO (2007)
(Costa Rica)).
132. Calzada Miranda & Castillo Viquez, supra note 123, at 2 (citing Constitutional




As a result of the jurisprudentially derived concept of the right to
health and the characteristics of the public health system, the writ
of amparo has taken on a role of prominence within the realm of
constitutional adjudication in Costa Rica, allowing individuals to
challenge adverse actions by government agencies in the context of
violations of health rights.
There are three distinguishing features of the health amparo.
First, a health amparo admitted for review by Constitutional
Chamber is reviewed on a priority basis over all other types of am-
paros and cases filed with the court,1 3 4 given the sensitive nature of
the request; however, as alluded to previously, amparos, including
health amparos, will never be reviewed by the Constitutional
Chamber over a habeas corpus petition.1 3 5 Second, a health amparo
is usually filed against government institutions, such as the Minis-
try of Health, the CCSS, hospitals, EBAIS, and health centers that
are administered by the government, as well as the administrators,
physicians, and staff employed by the aforementioned agencies.1 36
Third, the amparos can be filed for a wide variety of subject areas
concerning individual health rights, as a result of the broad inter-
pretation that has been given to the Constitutional Chamber's ju-
risprudentially-derived right to health.1 3 7 Throughout its review of
health amparos, the Constitutional Chamber has reviewed and de-
cided questions ranging from individual access to medication, med-
ical devices, surgical procedures, and vaccines, to the rights of chil-
dren, the elderly, and disabled individuals.13 8
Two types of frequently filed health amparos that have been the
subject of discussion by the Constitutional Chamber involve ques-
tions regarding timely access to treatment and access to medica-
tion. With regard to the issue of timely access to treatment, the
Constitutional Chamber has held that:
[I]n cases where the petitioner's ailment is not of a grave na-
ture, if there is an excessive delay in the provision of medical
attention, the Constitutional Chamber has granted amparos
for violations of individual health rights . . . because in cases
134. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 267.
135. Id.; see Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence - Constitutional Chamber of the Su-
preme Court of Justice (2013), https://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucionallin-
dex.php/jurisprudencia-por-tema?download=1433:salud&start=40 (Costa Rica).
136. Id.
137. Wilson, supra note 117, at 468-469.
138. See Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence - Constitutional Chamber of the Su-




involving a delay in the delivery of healthcare, a patient's clin-
ical outlook is directly related with his or her "quality of life,"
and, as a result, [the Constitutional Chamber] recognizes the
indivisible relationship between health and quality of life. 13 9
Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that the
performance of medical tests, treatments, or procedures-whether
diagnostic, medical or surgical in nature-must be performed
within a reasonable timeframe.140
The resolution of the issue of access to medication has been the
subject of shifting jurisprudence for the Constitutional Chamber.
The CCSS utilizes an approved list of medications (hereinafter
LOM in Spanish) that must be used by medical professions when
prescribing medication to patients in a public health setting.141 IS-
sues frequently arise whenever a physician seeks to prescribe med-
ication that is not in the LOM, and a CCSS pharmacotherapy com-
mittee rejects the doctor's request-either because the committee
finds that the LOM contains a drug with similar health properties
as the non-approved medicine or concludes that the proposed med-
ication will not aid the patient's treatment.142 Previously, the Con-
stitutional Chamber granted greater weight to the prescribing phy-
sician's opinion, arguing that a doctor was in a better position to
determine and prescribe the best treatment or medication, accord-
ing to the patient's prognosis and quality of life. 143 The Constitu-
tional Chamber's stance on this subject has shifted, placing a re-
quirement on the prescribing physician to provide objective reasons
behind his or her prescription of a non-LOM medication.144
More recently, for amparos related to the access to medication,
the Constitutional Chamber has requested independent reports by
the Department of Legal and Forensic Medicine, a government body
139. Calzada Miranda & Castillo Viquez, supra note 123, at 17-18 (citing Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Exp. 08-011347-0007-CO (2008) (Costa Rica))
(finding a public hospital's 2008 scheduling of an initial specialist examination for October of
2012 to be unreasonable and a violation of the individual's right to health).
140. Id. at 17 (citing Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Exp. No.
2007-14347-0007-CO (2007) (Costa Rica)) (ordering the CCSS and the Orthopedic Depart-
ment of a state-run hospital to perform a hip replacement on an elderly patient whose proce-
dure had been delayed for nine months).
141. Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social [Costa Rican Social Security Fund], Normativa
de la Lista Oficial de Medicamentos (LOM) [Policies of the Official List of Medications], art.
1 (2016), http://www.ccss.sa.cr/lom (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (click on the "Normativa" link
to download the relevant ZIP file; refer to the "NORMATIVA - LOM" file).
142. Calzada Miranda & Castillo Viquez, supra note 123, at 14-15.
143. Id. at 15 (citing Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Exp. 04-
2082-0007-CO (2004) (Costa Rica)).
144. Id. (citing Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Exp. 11-14898-
0007-CO (2011) (Costa Rica)).
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tied to the Judicial Power, to assist the Constitutional Chamber in
deciding whether a violation of the right to health exists, as pre-
sented in the petitioner's amparo request.1 45 In providing its report,
the Department of Legal and Forensic Medicine utilizes evidence-
based medical analyses and scientific evidence prepared by the
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews,14 6 which helps establish
the effectiveness of the requested medication and whether there are
alternative medications that would be as effective at treating the
petitioner's ailment.1 4 7
V. ANALYSIS OF THE AMPARO AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHAMBER'S ROLE IN THE ADJUDICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO HEALTH
A. Benefits
The health amparo has become a useful mechanism by which
Costa Ricans have been able to challenge perceived violations of
their right to health for several reasons. First, as noted previ-
ously,148 some of the key features of the amparo, such as the inex-
pensive nature of the writ, the low requirements for standing, and
the high degree of informality involved with the actual filing of the
amparo, have made it easier for these issues to be brought to the
attention of the highest judicial authority in Costa Rica. More im-
portantly, the amparo has effectively opened the judicial branch,
allowing Costa Ricans to seek relief from the Constitutional Cham-
ber, regardless of socioeconomic status or ability to procure legal
assistance.1 4 9
Second, the amparo, along with the operation of the Constitu-
tional Chamber, has also provided a mechanism in which individu-
als could receive a timely review of any claims of improper actions
by public agencies or servants, especially when an individual's right
145. See, e.g., Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Exp. 14-4680-
0007-CO (2014) (Costa Rica) (ordering the Department of Forensic Medicine to prepare a
report on osteoporosis medication); Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice,
Exp. 17-013037-0007-CO (2017) (Costa Rica) (requesting a medical report related to a peti-
tioner's amparo request for skin cancer medication); Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Justice, Exp. 17-004605-0007-CO (2017) (Costa Rica) (utilizing a report prepared by
the Department of Legal and Forensic Medicine to grant an amparo for breast cancer medi-
cation).
146. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (2017), http://www.cochraneli-
brary.com/cochrane-database-of-systematic-reviews/.
147. See Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Exp. 14-4680-0007-CO
(2014) (Costa Rica).




to health is perceived to be threatened. As mentioned previously,
healthcare amparos admitted for review by the Constitutional
Chamber are xamined and voted upon before those related to other
subjects, and they have a rapid turnaround when compared to other
individually-filed writs.150 The existence of the constitutional adju-
dication mechanism and a dedicated judicial body focused on re-
viewing these particular types of requests on an expedited basis is
important in the context of health and healthcare questions, espe-
cially when there is a possibility of permanent bodily injury or death
resulting from actions or omissions by a government agency.
Third, the Constitutional Chamber and constitutional adjudica-
tion process in Costa Rica have effectively served as an additional
check on the executive branch and executive agencies. As noted in
previous sections, most amparos, when granted by the Constitu-
tional Chamber, include orders and injunctions that could result in
financial penalties, administrative proceedings, and incarceration
if the government agency or public servant fails to comply with the
orders.15 1 As a result, the Constitutional Chamber and the amparo
have become a method of ensuring accountability on the govern-
ment and enhancing the rights of marginalized groups that would
not be able to enjoy their constitutional rights in the face of institu-
tional overreach.
B. Criticisms
It is undeniable that the healthcare amparo and the constitu-
tional adjudication process of these writs have brought positive
changes for countless individuals and groups of people who have
been subjected to unreasonable treatment or adverse actions by ex-
ecutive agencies and actors, including delays in the delivery of med-
ical treatment, extending waiting lists and limited access to medi-
cation, among other issues.152 However, the constitutional adjudi-
cation process is not free of issues or its share of criticism, given the
practical constraints present in the public health system in Costa
Rica.
First, when the Constitutional Chamber grants amparos and is-
sues orders to public agencies to deliver care-whether in the form
of medical or surgical procedures or the provision of medication-
the Constitutional Chamber substitutes the CCSS' judgment re-
garding the allocation of resources for its own based on the claims
150. See Promedio de Duracion de los Votos de Fondo, supra note 100.
151. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at art. 71 (Costa Rica).
152. Calzada Miranda & Castillo Viquez, supra note 123, at 16-21.
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brought forth by a petitioner. It is important to remember that the
health system in Costa Rica is a predominantly public one: The gov-
ernment, by and through the CCSS, acts as the largest owner of
medical facilities, the most prominent provider of medical services,
and the largest insurer-covering 90% of Costa Ricans.153 In order
to provide higher quality levels of healthcare to the population, the
Ministry of Health and the CCSS must be able to properly allocate
and distribute funds and resources throughout the entirety of the
healthcare system. By entering an order against the CCSS, the
Constitutional Chamber imposes a burden on the government
agency's ability to allocate financial and medical resources.
Similarly, the Constitutional Chamber's entry of orders places a
burden on hospital administrators, physicians and other profes-
sional staff involved in the delivery of care.154 CCSS-employed phy-
sicians and administrative staff frequently issue orders to their pa-
tients based on a professional medical opinion-subject to the eco-
nomic realities and constraints of the public health system, most of
which are beyond the control of the prescribing entity.155 However,
as noted previously, amparos that are granted by the Constitutional
Chamber are generally accompanied by judicial orders that will im-
pose financial and criminal sanctions upon those actors who fail to
comply with the orders. As a result, the physicians and adminis-
trators may be thrust into a difficult position in which they could be
punished for acting or failing to act when there is a constrained
ability to do so.
The Constitutional Chamber has addressed criticisms made
about its intervention in the Costa Rican healthcare system by the
rulings and orders issued from amparos.156 The Constitutional
Chamber indicated that the rulings have moved the CCSS to better
allocate its resources, both financial and medical, in order to better
serve and reach the more vulnerable sections of the population.157
By way of example, the Constitutional Chamber cited a study per-
formed by the University of Costa Rica, which indicated that the
effect of the Constitutional Chamber's sentences for health amparos
related to the purchase of medication represented only 1% of the
153. Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 267.
154. Calzada Miranda & Castillo Viquez, supra note 123, at 12, 14.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 12.
157. Id. at 26-27.
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yearly budget allocation for this expense.15 8 Similarly, within its
jurisprudence, the Constitutional Chamber has recognized the im-
portance of the CCSS' duty to engage in preventative health
measures159 and practices that would have long-term public health
impacts and benefits, such as vaccination campaigns and programs
that raise awareness regarding health risks of saturated and trans
fats.160
VI. CONCLUSION
The Costa Rican model of constitutional adjudication, as provided
by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica,
by and through the operation of the writ of amparo, has provided a
unique avenue through which individuals can adjudicate perceived
violations of their constitutional rights, especially when their
health and bodily integrity may be harmed if the adverse action en-
dures. The existence of a specialized judicial body and a constitu-
tional instrument allows for the effective resolution of issues with
several options for relief, including protective orders and the grant-
ing of relief through the resolution of the constitutional question
itself.
Even though the Constitutional Chamber's deliberation of issues
regarding individual access to health and healthcare might be crit-
icized for acting as a form of judicial overreach, or for imposing bur-
dens on an already burdened healthcare system, it is undeniable
that the Constitutional Chamber's rulings on these matters have
addressed significant issues. Given the nature of the public health
system in Costa Rica, the Constitutional Chamber and the health
amparo will continue to play a part in preserving individual rights.
VII. AFTERWORD
Over the course of four weeks in May and June 2015, I had the
privilege of visiting the Republic of Costa Rica and interning at the
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica.
Throughout the course of the internship, I met and worked closely
with Supreme Court magistrates, law clerks, and administrative
158. Id. (citing Albin Chaves Matamoros, Derecho a la Salud Piblica: papel de la Sala
Constitucional [The Right to Public Health: the role of the Constitutional Chamber], Depart-
ment of Public Health of the School of Medicine of the University of Costa Rica (2010) (Costa
Rica)).
159. Id. at 24-25.
160. Id. (citing Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Exp. No. 10-
002979-0007-CO (2010) (Costa Rica)).
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staff, allowing me to gain firsthand insight into the Costa Rican
constitutional adjudication process. This allowed me to witness and
participate in the filing, initial review, deliberation, ruling, and fi-
nal disposition of writs of amparo filed by Costa Rican citizens seek-
ing relief from the highest court for claims related to medical treat-
ment or care denied by Costa Rican government entities, such as
public hospitals or the Costa Rican Social Security Administration.
Additionally, I met with medical professionals and administrators
of the Costa Rican College of Doctors and Surgeons, and I engaged
in a discussion regarding the limitations and challenges faced by
Costa Rican public medical professionals and organizations in the
delivery of healthcare ordered by the Supreme Court of Costa Rica.
This article and the internship it was based on would not have
been possible without the participation of several individuals. I
would like to thank my advisor, Professor Robert S. Barker, for or-
ganizing this internship and allowing me to represent Duquesne
University School of Law while in Costa Rica. Special thanks to the
McGinley family and the McGinley Public Service Law Fellowship
for providing me with the funding that made this wonderful expe-
rience possible. Lastly, I would like to thank Olman Rodriguez
Loaiza, Xinia Flores Quesada, and all the law clerks, judicial staff,
constitutional scholars, members of the Supreme Court of Costa
Rica, and countless other individuals whom I met in San Jos6, for
their hospitality and warmth during my time in La Suiza de Cen-
troamrica.
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